By Rahimullah Yusufzai

Already suffering from the fall-out of the eight-year-old US-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan is now confronted with arguably the most dangerous phase of the seemingly endless battle. This is a critical stage also for the future of Islamabad's uneasy relationship with Washington.

With the formidable US spy network, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), threatening revenge after losing seven agents including two women in a Taliban-sponsored suicide bombing in Afghanistan's Khost province bordering North Waziristan, there will definitely be an escalation in its not-so-secret war being conducted primarily through unpiloted predator and reaper aircraft striking targets in Pakistan's tribal areas. One should now expect North Waziristan and, to a lesser extent, South Waziristan and other parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to become a frequent hunting ground for the drones operating in the region..

Pakistan's dilemma in these difficult times is hard to explain. It is critical of US drone strikes on its soil, but is unwilling and unable to go beyond the customary and almost muted protests over the violation of its airspace. It doesn't want to risk America's wrath by trying to shoot down the CIA-operated spy planes. It has the capability to bring down the intruding drones, but such an act would be considered hostile and unpardonable by the US. Pakistan has been designated the closest non-NATO ally by the US and members of the western military alliance, and is expected to remain a steadfast partner in the so-called 'war on terror'. It is being paid to fight the war within its borders and the US military aid has now been augmented by civilian assistance amounting to $7.5 billion over the next five years.

However, Pakistan has to pay a huge price for remaining a US ally. At a time when public opinion surveys show more than 80 per cent of Pakistanis opposing US policies and mentioning it as a bigger threat to Pakistan than India, Al Qaeda and Taliban, it cannot be easy for any government or military to justify an unpopular alliance with America. The closer Pakistan is seen standing with the US, the greater the chances of its streets becoming restless and the conservative sections of its population showing resentment. In a world where the Muslim populations have become polarised with their rulers mostly siding with the US, contrary to the aspirations of their subjects, it becomes all the more difficult for politically unstable and economically depressed countries such as Pakistan to justify its alliance with America. Pakistan would certainly become a less violent place if it could detach itself from the US war on terror but this is easier said than done. It won't be easy for Pakistan to extricate itself from a suffocating embrace with the US and even if it were to happen, the consequences would be painful.

Already, there has been a dramatic increase in the number and intensity of the US drone attacks, particularly in North Waziristan where there was no shortage of local and foreign militants. More have flocked there from the adjoining South Waziristan agency following the ground offensive by Pakistan's security forces on October 17 last year. Reports showed there were 44 strikes by the US drones in 2009 in which 708 people, overwhelmingly Pakistani civilians though many guilty of hosting wanted Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, were killed. The known militants killed in these attacks were few and far between and among them were Pakistani Taliban commanders Baitullah Mehsud and Haji Omar, and Al Qaeda's Usama al-Kin and Sheikh Ahmad Salim. In 2010, there have already been three drone strikes in North Waziristan and many more should be expected. If these airstrikes are to continue at this pace, 2010 will see record attacks by the US drones.

It isn't hard to imagine the anger that these US missile strikes will cause in North Waziristan and other parts of country, not only against America but also the government and armed forces for their inability to protect Pakistani citizens and territory, and for continuing to side with the US. Sections of the Pakhtun youth on both sides of Pak-Afghan border have already been radicalised, and more would be tempted to take the same emotional route as the US drone programme in Pakistan's tribal areas escalates and the military surge ordered by President Obama in Afghanistan leads to more fighting.

There is no doubt that the December 30, 2009 suicide attack on the CIA station in Khost at the Forward Operating Base Chapman was a historic blow as it was the deadliest ever in the spy agency's history. In one incident, seven CIA operatives who for years had been hunting key Al Qaeda and Taliban figures were dead and six others wounded. Those who were killed include the CIA station head, an unidentified woman in her 30s, who since 1990s had been part of the team unsuccessfully chasing Osama bin Laden. They were probably the best CIA assets working in a dangerous place, hiring and cultivating Afghan and Pakistani informants, coordinating the drone attacks in Pakistan's tribal areas and collectively possessing the most comprehensive knowledge about the Al Qaeda and Taliban. The eighth spy killed in the suicide bombing was a Jordanian, Captain Ali bin Zeid, from his country's intelligence organisation, Mukhabirat. He is the first soldier from Jordan, which along with Turkey, UAE, Kazakhstan and Albania are the Muslim countries with troops deployed in Afghanistan as part of the US-led coalition forces, to die in battle in the war-battered country. His presence also explains the fact that spies from Middle Eastern countries are an essential part of the CIA campaign.

Perhaps bigger than the loss of its experienced agents was the embarrassment caused to the CIA and the US army of the security lapse at a base as secure as the old, Soviet-built Khost airbase where the suicide bomber was able to strike. The Afghan Taliban were obviously proud of the feat and they wasted no time in claiming that a double-agent Afghan named Samiullah was the suicide bomber, a CIA informant, allowed unhindered access to the base.

It was clear that the Haqqani Network, named after the legendary Afghan mujahideen and Taliban commander Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani but now run by his son Sirajuddin Haqqani, was behind the suicide bombing even though the Pakistani Taliban commander Qari Hussain unconvincingly claimed responsibility for the attack to avenge the assassination of Baitullah Mehsud. The US army, or the CIA to be specific, and the Haqqanis were already involved in a deadly war of revenge against each other and their blood feud has now become deadlier and personal. In the 80s, the elder Haqqani and CIA cooperated with each other fighting the Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan. Today, they are rivals.

The US Special Forces and CIA have killed scores of Haqqani's men, women and children in secret operations and drone strikes in Afghanistan and in North Waziristan, where the family migrated from Khost after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. The CIA will now try harder to eliminate the Haqqanis, who control one of the most powerful Taliban groups in Afghanistan. To succeed, the CIA will make more frequent use of drones in North Waziristan and other Pakistani tribal areas, and hire a larger number of informants, (better screened to prevent incidents like the recent suicide bombing at Khost).

Aware that escalation in US drone strikes will further destabilise Pakistan, Islamabad is urging restraint on part of Washington. But the US, upset that Pakistan hasn't taken any action against the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban's Quetta Shura, is unlikely to heed this advice. More drone attacks could also cause the collapse of the critical peace deals that the Pakistan government has made with powerful, non-TTP Pakistani Taliban commanders Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan and Maulvi Nazeer in Wana to prevent them from joining forces with the Hakimullah Mehsud-led militants in South Waziristan.

It seems the US prefers this scenario so that Pakistan's armed forces are forced to launch military operations in both Wana and Shakai in North and South Waziristan. This will widen the battlefield and result in more retaliatory suicide attacks by the militants in Pakistani cities. In case Islamabad decides under US pressure to cut off its links with the Afghan Taliban, particularly the Haqqanis, it means creating more enemies at a time when Pakistan is finding it difficult to put down an insurgency fed by Pakistani Taliban and other home-grown jihadis.

The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar